Yea, I know -- it's getting old and stale . . . . but here's the explanation anyway
![]() I know, nobody could care less at this point. I did commit to an explanation, however, so here it is for the one or two of you out there that are still paying attention . . . . Click here to continue reading . . . ![]() I know, nobody could care less at this point. I did commit to an explanation, however, so here it is for the one or two of you out there that are still paying attention . . . . 1. Mr. Barr is correct: the Hurley case doesn't apply Let's start by getting the Hurley case out of the way. Mr. Barr is 100% correct when he expresses an opinion that the Hurley case does not apply. In that case, the free speech argument was not pursued at the Supreme Court by those wishing to march in the parade. In fact, those wishing to march: . . . originally argued that the Council's conduct was not purely private, but had the character of state action. . . . When asked at oral argument whether they challenged the conclusion by the Massachusetts' courts that no state action is involved in the parade, respondents' counsel answered that they "do not press that issue here." . . . In this Court, then, their claim for inclusion in the parade rests solely on the Massachusetts public accommodations law.Consequently, since the Hurley case didn't analyze the "state action" issue evident in our situation, the case has no applicability to our situation. 2. City ordinances treat the Heritage Festival differently from other festivals and parades, placing an affirmative duty on the City Manager to "approve" of the manner in which the "the streets" are used. Any such "approval" must conform with the law. As stated in my first post on this subject, we have an ordinance that states: Sec. 10-306. Responsible organization; license application; use of city streets, parks and other property.We have another ordinance that states: Sec. 58-61. Intent.Note that the wording is mandatory, not discretionary. The City Manager "shall" approve, which would require that the the plans be in conformance with city laws. This alone provides a basis for enforcing the anti-discrimination ordinance with regard to the Heritage Festival Parade. 3. The State Action Doctrine applies as well There is a line of cases that establish three ways in which private action operates as as state action. State action, of course, requires that an individual's constitutional rights be honored and observed, so anytime a private individual or organization acts "under color of law," s/he must conform the same standards as the government. Put another way, there are numerous instances throughout American history in which governmental organizations have attempted to shirk their duty, justifying their failure to observe and enforce the law by claiming that the actor involved is private and not public. The backdrop for many of these cases involved racial discrimination in the American South and the government's numerous attempts to characterize such action as private rather than governmental. The Supreme Court has three "tests" for making this determination: (1) the "state involvement" test; (2) the "symbiotic relationship" test; and (3) the "public function" test. The "state involvement" standard (see Lombard v. La., 373 U.S. 267, (1963)) arose when Louisiana stood with a private business that refused to desegregate, permitting police officers to enforce unconstitutional segregation. In that case, the Supreme Court held that state enforcement of the private assertion amounted to state action and consequently could not infringe upon constitutional rights. Consequently, under this time-honored legal doctrine, the City should have refused to permit the Heritage Festival organizers from banning a group based on its desire to advocate a political issue, and instead should have enforced its existing ordinance and directed the organizers to permit SCIT to march. The "symbiotic relationship" test is not applicable to this situation, as the facts and circumstances in that case are substantially different from those in ours. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The "public function" standard (see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)) initially came up in the context of an attempt to use a trespassing law to stop a person from distributing religious literature on a street in a company-owned town. The Supreme Court opined that such a prohibition could not withstand the rigors of the First Amendment. Consequently, the City of Ypsilanti cannot avoid enforcing its own ordinance by merely delegating decision-making authority to a private actor. Thusly, by ordinance and binding case law from the Supreme Court, the City should never again permit a group to be banned from Ypsilanti's Heritage Festival Parade for merely asserting its political or civil rights, nor should any group be discriminated against on the basis of the protected classes listed in our ordinance. 'Nuff said. |

















